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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EU1 in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 
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Programme in Economie Policy
The Working Papers series
The Schuman Centre’s Programme in Economic Policy provides a framework 
for the presentation and development of ideas and research that can constitute 
the basis for informed policy-making in any area to which economic reasoning 
can make a contribution. No particular areas have been prioritized against others, 
nor is there any preference for "near-policy" treatments. Accordingly, the scope 
and style of papers in the series is varied.
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High and persistent unemployment is a key policy issue in many OECD 
countries, particularly in Europe. Many initiatives have been taken to reduce 
this problem. In 1994, the OECD launched the OECD Jobs Study, which 
contained both a thorough analysis of the issue and a comprehensive set of 
policy recommendations for dealing with it. This paper1 reviews the experience 
countries have had with implementing policies to reduce unemployment. As a 
background to this, it first presents a brief review of unemployment and wage 
developments as well as an overview of the OECD Jobs Strategy.
Unemployment, Wages and the OECD Jobs Strategy
There may not be much which is particularly European about the unemployment 
problem in Europe. That is not to say that cultural backgrounds and norms play 
no role. But it is probably the case that if European labour market institutions 
and European macroeconomic and structural policies had been in place in other 
comers of the world, then unemployment would have been a problem there as 
well* 2. That also means that it is important to look beyond Europe both to 
identify the mechanisms that have created high European unemployment and to 
look for policies which may help to bring European unemployment down. In 
what follows, this paper therefore draws on experience in European as well as 
non-European OECD countries.
Much research has been made on unemployment and a lot of statistics are 
available. Presenting a brief review of unemployment is therefore a selection 
process, which in this case has led to a focus on six features.
I ) The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
those of the OECD or its Member governments. This paper draws heavily on Elmeskov 
(1998).
2) In a comprehensive cross-country/time series study of unemployment and its determinants, 
Scarpetta (1996) tried to identify outlying observations which did not fit the estimated 
general pattern of links between unemployment rates and determinants. Both this analysis 
and a look at the estimated country-specific unemployment components indicated little 



























































































Figure I . S tandardised unem ploym ent rates in OECD regions. 1972-961
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1 Standardised unemployment rates lor all countries except lor Austria. Denmark. Greece. Iceland. Luxembourg and Turkey 
Data for 1996 are O E C D  estimates 
2. Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary. Korea. Mexico and Poland 
3 United States and Canada
4. EU15. Iceland. Norway. Switzerland, and Turkey.
5. Australia and New Zealand 




























































































First, high and rising unemployment has been a particular problem in Europe 
(Figure 1). Some of the non-European OECD countries have managed to 
preserve low and/or unchanged unemployment over the last two to three 
decades. This is notably the case for the two large ones. United States and 
Japan. However, there are also European countries, such as Norway, where 
unemployment has remained relatively low for many years. Noteworthy is also 
the tendency for unemployment to rise rapidly in downturns but to fall back 
only slowly thereafter -  a time series feature which is common across most 
regions but most pronounced in Europe, where some recoveries made hardly 
any impact on unemployment.
Second, unemployment is predominantly structural even if there are significant 
cyclical components in some countries (Figure 2). By their nature, estimates of 
structural unemployment are subject to both numerical and conceptual 
uncertainties, and the OECD indicator is only one among many (its derivation is 
described in Box 1). Nevertheless, it is noticeable that changes in estimated 
structural unemployment rates have generally gone together with corresponding 
movements in a range of other labour market indicators such as long-term 
unemployment, the number of discouraged workers and employment rates 
(Figure 3). Moreover, comparison with other time-varying indicators of 
structural unemployment in most cases show relatively high correlations 
(Elmeskov, 1993)3.
3) Holm and Somervuori (1997) argue that in the case of Finland the short-term NAWRU 
estimate deviates significantly from their estimate of a time-varying long-term equilibrium 
rate of unemployment. For countries such as Finland and Sweden, which experienced very 
abrupt increases in actual unemployment in the beginning of the 1990s, uncertainties about 




























































































Figure 2. Structural and cyclical components of unemployment rates'
Per cent of total labour force
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Note.
I. Based on national unemployment definitions. Structural unemployment data are based on Secretanat estimates of the non 





























































































Figure 3. Change in structural unemployment and employment rate, 1990-95
(percentage points)
Change in cyclically adjusted employment rate
Note:
I . Structural unem ployment data are based on Secretariat estimates o f the non-accelerating wage rate of 





























































































The OECD indicator of structural unemployment is based on the notion of a non-accelerating 
wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU). Estimates are derived under the assumption that 
changes in wage inflation are proportional to the gap between actual unemployment and the 
NAWRU:
D2 log W = - a  • (U-NAWRU); a  > o
where D is the first-difference operator, and W and U are levels of wages and the 
unemployment rate, respectively. Using consecutive observations, and assuming the NAWRU 
to be constant between two consecutive years, an estimate of a  can be calculated as:
ot = - D1 log W/DU
which yields an estimate of the NAWRU as
NAWRU = U - (DU/D3 log W) • D2 log W.
Conceptually, the NAWRU estimated in this way is a short-run concept, i.e. it indicates the 
rate of unemployment which, in a given year and based on the actual history of 
unemployment, would be associated with a constant rate of nominal wage increases'. In 
practice, the OECD indicator of structural unemployment takes into account not only the 
(suitably smoothed) ‘'mechanical" estimates based on the above method but also the views of 
country experts (Giomo et al., 1995).
Box 1. The OECD indicator of structural unemployment
I) In the presence o f speed-limit effects or slow adjustment, a lower (or higher) rate of 
unemployment may be associated with stable wage inflation in the long run, but this rate of 




























































































Third, high unemployment is usually accompanied by a high share of long-term 
unemployment (Figure 4). This suggests that high unemployment is associated 
with marginalisation of the unemployed. There is evidence to suggest that the 
long-term unemployed exert less downward pressure on wages than people who 
have recently become unemployed (Elmeskov and MacFarlan, 1993). It is also 
noticeable that the risk of becoming unemployed is actually higher in the United 
States, with relatively low unemployment, than it is in Europe with relatively 
high unemployment. This reflects that once people become unemployed in 
Europe there is a much bigger risk of becoming stuck in that situation.
Fourth, in much of Europe high unemployment also goes together with weak 
employment for marginal groups on the labour market. For example, 
employment rates for young workers and for older adults are comparatively low. 
In the latter case, this reflects inter alia the proliferance of early retirement and 
similar schemes. By contrast, employment rates for men between 25 and 
54 years of age, which are often taken to be a core group on the labour market, 
vary much less across countries and regions.
Fifth, unemployment rates are disproportionately high for low-skilled workers. 
This is the result of a long-term trend away from the use of low-skilled labour 
which, however, has been partly offset by a relative decline in supply (see e g. 
OECD, 1997a). The trend towards declining demand for low-skilled workers 
has sometimes been linked with trends towards globalisation and technological 
change4.
Sixth, there seems to be a link across countries between unemployment and 
participation rates: where unemployment is high, participation is low (Figure 4). 
Thus, the unemploymént rate shows only part of the employment problem — the 
rest is hidden both in various schemes such as early retirement, invalidity etc., 
but also in people being discouraged from entering the labour force. At present, 
some countries, including the United States, Japan, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland combine low unemployment with high rates of labour force 
participation. By contrast, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain and, despite strong 
recent improvements, Ireland share with some of the transition economies the 
combination of high unemployment and low labour force participation. Other 
countries are in intermediate positions.
4) This is particularly so because relative wage developments appear unable to explain the 
shift in labour demand. Evidence on the influence of globalisation and technological 
change mostly suggests that the former played a relatively limited role compared to the 





























































































Figure 4 Unemployment, long-term unem ploym ent1 and labour force participation2 1996
A. Unemployment and the incidence of long-term unemployment
Share ol tong-term in total 
unemployment
ore- « huh 
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B. Unemployment and labour force participation
Participation rate
1 Long-term unemployment is delmed as 12 months and over
2 Labour force as a share of total population 15-64 years
3 Data tor long-term unemployment in Germany reler to 1995
4 Data lor Greece reler to 1995




























































































These six main features of unemployment do not permit any simple diagnosis of 
the problem. Nevertheless, they are not inconsistent with the view that insider- 
outsider distinctions play a significant role together with influences on demand 
and supply of low-skilled labour.
Wage developments in the United States and Europe have also differed 
significantly. As concerns aggregate wages, real compensation rose rapidly in 
Europe over the last couple of decades while it broadly stagnated in the United 
Stales. To some extent this difference reflected higher productivity growth in 
Europe. But the reverse causality was probably also important. That is. higher 
real wage growth forced firms to rationalise and forced low-productive firms 
and workers out of production5. As concerns relative wages, there has been 
broad stability of wage dispersions in continental Europe but significant 
widening in the United States, the United Kingdom and some other countries 
(see e g. OECD, 1997b). In the United Stales, widening wage dispersion in a 
context of broad stagnation of average real wages implied that those at the 
bottom suffered real cuts in pay. This development gave rise to the discussion 
about the ‘working poor’, even if poverty in all countries is linked 
predominantly to people not being employed6.
Against this background, the Jobs Study proposed a balanced and wide-ranging 
set of policy recommendations to reduce unemployment, raise employment and 
increase prosperity (see Box 2). These recommendations aim, on the one hand, 
to raise the ability of economies to adjust and to adapt to new developments, 
including cyclical variations as well as trends towards globalisation and 
technological change, and, on the other hand, to increase their knowledge base 
and innovative capacity.
Box 2. The OECD Jobs Strategy
1. Set macroeconomic policy such that it will both encourage growth and, in conjunction with 
good structural policies, make it sustainable, i.e. non-inflationary.
2. Enhance the creation and diffusion of technological know-how by improving frameworks 
for its development.
5) See e.g. the discussion in International Monetary Fund (1996).
6) Poverty rates after taxes and transfers for individuals living in households without 
employed adults vastly exceed those for individuals in households with at least one 




























































































3. Increase flexibility of working-time (both short-term and lifetime) voluntarily sought by 
workers and employers.
4. Nurture an entrepreneurial climate by eliminating impediments to, and restrictions on. the 
creation and expansion of enterprises.
5. Make wage and labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions that prevent wages 
from reflecting local conditions and individual skill levels, in particular of younger 
workers.
6. Reform employment security provisions that inhibit the expansion of employment in the 
private sector.
7. Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and reinforce their effectiveness
8. Improve labour force skills and competences through wide-ranging changes in education 
and training systems.
9. Reform unemployment and related benefit systems -  and their interactions with the tax 
system — such that societies’ fundamental equity goals are achieved in ways that impinge 
far less on the efficient functioning of the labour markets.
10. Enhance product market competition so as to reduce monopolistic tendencies and weaken 
insider-outsider mechanisms while also contributing to a more innovative and dynamic 
economy.
Since the publication of the Jobs Study, work at the OECD has continued on 
two tracks. First, a number of thematic reviews by the OECD Secretariat have 
further explored appropriate policy orientations in specific fields7. Second, the 
Economic and Development Review Committee (EDRC) has been mandated by 
OECD Ministers to examine the implementation of the OECD Jobs Study 
recommendations in individual Member countries8. Based on the EDRC review 
process, but drawing also on thematic reviews and recent work by the OECD 
Secretariat, the remainder of this paper pre ents the key lessons learned from 
the country-specific work.
7) The OECD Secretariat reports on four thematic reviews were presented to the OECD 
Ministerial Council Meeting in May 1996. They are: Enhancing the effectiveness of 
active labour market policies; Making work pay: A thematic review of taxes, benefits, 
employment and unemployment; Interactions between structural reform, 
macroeconomic policy and economic performance; and Technology, Productivity and 
Job Creation. A fifth thematic review is under way on policies to enhance 
entrepreneurship.




























































































Main Lessons from Implementing the Jobs Strategy
Overall, the EDRC reviews j f  Member countries’ experience with 
implementation of the OECD Jobs Strategy give rise to both hope and caution. 
A clear message from the review process is that comprehensive reforms along 
the lines of the recommendations in the OECD Jobs Study are capable of 
expanding employment opportunities and reducing structural unemployment. 
However, only a few countries have introduced and sustained policy reforms in 
a sufficiently wide-ranging and consistent way to achieve such an improvement 
in labour market performance. This is partly because implementing the OECD 
Jobs Strategy sometimes involves difficult trade-offs between different policy 
concerns. Moreover, special interest groups often put up strong resistance to 
needed reforms. In what follows, the discussion of the main lessons learned 
from the EDRC country review process has been organised under the six broad 
headings identified by the OECD Secretariat in OECD (1997b).
1. High and persistent unemployment has been the result of both 
conjunctural and structural fo 'ces, and it can be durably reduced
As shown previously, unemployment in the OECD area as a whole rose over the 
period 1990-96 from its already high level at the end of the previous decade. 
Based on OECD Secretariat estimates, most of this increase was cyclical, but 
structural unemployment may also have gone up. Area-wide developments 
mask considerable differences across individual Member countries (Figure 5). 
In part, this reflects different cyclical positions. But structural unemployment 
rates have also shown diverse trends (Table 1), often moving in the same 




























































































Figure 5. Changes in structural and cyclical components of unemployment rates1







□  Change in total unemployment rate ■  Change in structural unemployment rate
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Note:
I. Based on national unemployment definitions. Structural unemployment data are based on Secretariat estimates of the non­





























































































Table 1. Structural unemployment in the OECD countries, 1986-961
A s  a per cent o f total labour force




... rem ained fa irly  stable:
... decreased:
1986 1990 1996
Finland 5.5 8.0 15.4
Sweden 2.1 3.2 6.7
Germany 7.3 6.9 9.6
Iceland 0.8 1.5 3.8
Switzerland 0.7 1.3 3.1
Spain 19.1 19.8 20.9
Greece 6.7 7.0 8.0
Italy 8.4 9.7 10.6
Portugal 6.1 4,9 5.8
Austria 4.1 4.9 5.4
France 8.9 9.3 9.7
Norway2 3.1 4.2 5.1
A ustralia 8.1 8.2 8.5
Japan 2.5 2.5 2.7
Turkey 7.5 7.6 7.5
United States 6.2 5.8 5.6
Belgium ' 11.7 10.8 10.6
C anada' 8.3 9.0 8.5
Denmark2 8.6 9.6 9.0
Netherlands 8.0 7.0 6.3
New Zealand 4.7 7.3 6.0
United Kingdom 10.2 8.4 7.0
Ireland 15.3 16.0 12.8
OECD structural unemployment rate 7.0 6.8 7.1
OECD actual unemployment rate4 7.7 6.1 7.7
Notes:
1. Based on national definitions o f unemployment. Structural unem ploym ent data arc based on 
Secretariat estim ates o f the non-accelerating wage rate o f unemployment (NAW RU) made for the OECD 
Economic Outlook . 60, 1996. A change is considered significant (in absolute terms) if it exceeds one 
standard-deviation. The latter was calculated for each series and country over the 1986-96 period.
2. Canada, Denmark and Norway had an increasing structural unem ployment rate in the late 1980s up to the 
beginning of the 1990s.
3. Belgium had a decreasing structural unem ployment rate in the second half of the 1980s.





























































































Among individual countries, already high structural unemployment appears to 
have risen further over the 1990s in Spain, Italy and, to a minor extent, France. 
In Finland and Sweden, structural unemployment has risen abruptly from 
previous low levels. A number of other small European countries with 
traditionally low unemployment rates also recorded increases in structural 
unemployment. Some countries, including the United States, Japan and Norway, 
have managed to keep structural unemployment steady at a relatively low level 
The most encouraging new developments were registered in the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands and New Zealand, where falls in structural 
unemployment rates either began or continued in the course of the 199Us\ In 
a context of worries about European unemployment, it is notable that three of 
these four countries are European.
2. Many countries have made progress in implementing the Jobs Strategy, 
but progress has been uneven both between countries and between 
different areas of policy
Developments in structural unemployment over the 1990s to a large extent 
reflect the progress made in implementing the OECD Jobs Strategy. Some 
OECD countries had introduced a number of main recommendations of the 
OECD Jobs Study well before the completion of the study. Indeed, the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand have pursued both wide-ranging and deep structural 
reforms, beginning already in the early to mid-1980s. These are also among the 
countries where the estimated rate of structural unemployment has fallen 
significantly -- since the second half of the 1980s in the United Kingdom, which 
began earlier to introduce structural reform, and since the early 1990s in New 
Zealand. Based on a more gradualist approach, the Netherlands has also pursued 
a comprehensive reform programme starting in the first half of the 1980s, with 910
9) Statistical tests reported in OECD (1997b) suggest that the decline in structural 
unemployment over the period 1990-96 in these four countries is significant and tests 
based on trends in actual unemployment tend to confirm this impression. Falls in Danish 
and Canadian structural unemployment rates of about Vi percentage point were not 
statistically significant but may become so if, as seems likely, trends towards decline 
continue beyond the observation period.
10) Recently, there has been some discussion as to whether the Netherlands should be 
regarded as an example of successful policy adjustment given, not least, its relatively high 
level of non-participation in the labour force (e.g. McKinsey Global Institute, 1997). 
However, as discussed in OECD (1997b) there seems to have been a notable improvement 
in the labour market situation, even if levels of inactivity, and in particular levels of 
invalidity, remain high. The assessment, thus, depends in part on whether the focus is put 




























































































positive results in the form of falling structural unemployment since the second 
half of that decade. In Ireland, macroeconomic stabilisation began in the first 
half of the 1980s, while structural changes commenced in the second half of the 
1980s; structural unemployment has declined during the 1990s. These 
experiences suggest that, even where policies are reformed over a broad range, 
lags may be considerable between the introduction of reform and the subsequent 
improvement of labour market performance.
The reform processes in these four countries share a number of common 
features". One is that they were all initiated at a time when serious economic 
disequilibria had made it clear that existing policies could no longer be 
sustained. Another is that all four countries put in place macroeconomic 
frameworks focused on sound public finances and effective control of inflation. 
Even though the countries were not always successful in implementing these 
frameworks, by 1996 Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand combined 
inflation below 2 per cent (measured by the GDP deflator) with general 
government balances which were either in surplus (New Zealand) or had 
deficits of less than 3 per cent of GDP. Nevertheless, reform processes also 
differed between these countries, reflecting different starting positions, not least 
as regards structural policies. Examples include:
• The Netherlands where high labour costs, including very high payroll taxes, 
were perceived as a problem, focused on achieving general wage moderation 
through centralised bargaining and tax reductions, restrictions on social 
transfers, lowering minimum wages, including in particular for young 
workers, and scaling back payroll taxes, especially on low-wage groups.
• The United Kingdom had a heritage of nationalised industries and troubled 
labour relations and gave priority to product market reform, including 
privatisation, and reform of industrial relations.
• New Zealand, which was arguably among the most protectionist OECD 
countries at the beginning of the 1980s, gave early priority to trade 
liberalisation and reduced government intervention in its comprehensive 
reform programme1 2.
• Ireland, which was faced with a dependency problem, in the presence of 
unemployment and poverty traps due to interaction between the tax and 
transfer systems, and had a tradition of weak education effort, has taken
11) Main elements of reforms are described in the relevant OECD Economic Surveys.




























































































More recently, Canada and Australia have carried out significant and wide- 
ranging reforms, but the results are yet to be seen. In other countries, reforms 
have typically been less wide-ranging though individual reforms have 
sometimes been significant. In some countries, including Germany, France. 
Italy and Belgium, political constraints prevented greater breadth and/or depth 
of reform (see below).
In the United States, Japan and Norway, policy settings prevented a significant 
rise in structural unemployment from occurring in the first place. Arguably, the 
three countries managed to maintain low unemployment because policies in 
important respects followed the main thrust of the OECD Jobs Strategy, though 
with clear differences of emphasis between the countries. Thus, the United 
States has traditionally operated and adapted its structural policies so as to be 
consistent with flexible labour and product markets while also placing emphasis 
on macroeconomic policies geared towards sustainable high employment. In 
Japan, institutional features have allowed high flexibility of wages and working 
hours at the same time as favouring geographical mobility and functional 
versatility of labour within enterprises. And in Norway, macroeconomic 
stability has been given priority, against the background of the flexibility 
provided by oil and gas revenues, and emphasis has been given to human 
capital formation. Nonetheless, even in these three cases, areas in which policy 
can be improved were identified by the EDRC.
At the same time as initial, and different, starting positions of countries have 
conditioned progress in the 1990s in implementing the Jobs Study 
recommendations, reform efforts in different areas have met with varying 
degrees of political resistance across countries. Partly as a result, progress 
within specific structural policy areas has differed considerably from country to 
country (Box 3). Hence, it is difficult to draw strong, OECD-wide conclusions 
about reforms in specific areas in the 1990s. *•
action to lower the generosity of unemployment benefits, reduce marginal
effective tax rates and improve human capital formation.
Box 3. Prominent structural policy reforms in the 1990s1
For each of the main structural policy fields comprised under the OECD Jobs Strategy, this 
box presents some of the most significant policy developments so far in the 1990s:
• Transfers and taxes. Unemployment benefit support levels or effective durations have 
been cut back in the United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain 
and Sweden, whereas the generosity of unemployment and related welfare benefits was 




























































































made significant changes to these parameters but many countries tightened eligibility, 
availability or willingness-to-work requirements, as well as rules concerning temporary 
layoffs. Invalidity schemes have been tightened in Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. 
Possibilities for retirement before the statutory retirement age have been tightened in 
France, Italy and Greece, while in a number of countries decisions have been taken or are 
under implementation to raise standard retirement ages (Germany, Italy, United Kingdom. 
Australia, Belgium. New Zealand. Portugal, Switzerland). Action has been taken to reduce 
high marginal effective tax rates on low incomes in France, the United Kingdom. Canada. 
Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden, while measures to 
reduce unemployment traps through the use of employment-conditional benefits were 
introduced or expanded in the United States, the United Kingdom. Canada. Australia. 
Ireland and New Zealand. The average tax wedge on production workers was reduced in 
the Netherlands, Turkey and, to a smaller extent, Norway but significantly increased in 
Australia, Finland and Greece. Within an overall unchanged tax wedge, there was a shift 
away from payroll taxes in France and Sweden, but in the opposite direction in Denmark.
• Employment protection legislation. The United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain 
significantly eased employment protection for permanent workers, with further, future 
easing agreed between the social partners in the latter country. In contrast, the legislation 
became tighter in France and Luxembourg. Germany and Australia first tightened and then 
relaxed these policies. Italy, Spain and Sweden allowed the use of temporary work 
agencies, while restrictions on fixed-term contracts were eased in Belgium and tightened in 
Spain.
• Wage formation. The most comprehensive liberalisation of the industrial relations 
framework resulted from implementing the Employment Contracts Act in New Zealand in 
1991. In contrast, wage formation in Belgium has become increasingly influenced by 
government intervention. Most countries have made little change to industrial relations 
frameworks though Australia is in the process of implementing significant reforms with the 
aim of making wage formation more decentralised. A number of European countries have 
pursued tripartite agreements. Significant relative reductions in legal minimum wages have 
taken place in the Netherlands and New Zealand. France. Belgium and the Netherlands 
have significantly reduced non-wage labour costs for low-wage workers. Some countries 
have taken action towards establishing identical industrial relations frameworks in the 
public and private sectors (Italy, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand) and to 
ensure similar patterns of wage formation (Italy, New Zealand, Sweden). •
• Working-tiine flexibility. Regulations restricting unusual working hours were eased in 
France, Italy, Finland, Greece and Spain, but measures to discourage overtime were 
introduced in France and Finland. At the same time an overall maximum on weekly work 
hours was enacted at the EU level and, by extension, in the non-EU members of the EEA. 
Regulation concerning part-time work was eased in France, Italy, Austria, Greece and 




























































































• Active labour market policy. Emphasis on job-search assistance has generally gained in 
importance in English-speaking countries. Austria. Belgium and Switzerland hut increased 
caseloads have made it difficult to maintain traditionally high ambitions in this area in 
some Nordic countries. In a major innovation, the market for mployment services has 
been made fully contestable in Australia and public monopolies on job placement services 
have been eliminated in Germany, Austria, Denmark and Finland.
• Education and training. The length of compulsory education has been extended in 
Belgium, Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway, while national testing at key stages 
has been introduced in France, England, New Zealand, Sweden and Spain. Curricula and 
school governance have been reformed in several countries, while the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand have introduced greater freedom in choice of school. Various steps to 
strengthen vocational education have been taken in English-speaking countries. Japan. 
France, Italy, Austria, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. In 
recognition of the investment aspect of higher education, tuition fees in public universities 
have been raised in the United States, Australia and New Zealand, but they have been 
abolished in Ireland. Denmark, Spain and Sweden have strengthened adult education.
• Product market competition. The creation and deepening of regional trade blocks, 
including NAFTA, the EU Single Market and the customs union between the EU and 
Turkey, together with further trade liberalisation as a result of the Uruguay Round, 
increased competition from imports in almost all OECD countries, and unilateral 
reductions of trade barriers took place in Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland. Various 
aspects of competition law were strengthened in a large number of countries. Measures to 
ease general licensing requirements have been taken in the Netherlands and barriers to 
inter-regional competition are being lowered in Canada, Australia and Switzerland. Retail 
competition has been strengthened by less restrictive shop-opening hours (Germany. Italy, 
Austria, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands) and an easing of restrictions on large-scale stores 
(Japan), though France has tightened the latter type of regulation. Competition in the 
financial sector is due to increase in Japan, Mexico and EU countries, while some 
liberalisation of professional services has taker place in Australia and Ireland. Early 
liberalisation steps have been taken in telecommunications (United States, United 
Kingdom, Australia, Finland, Sweden), electricity (United Kingdom, Australia, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden) and railways (Germany, United Kingdom, Denmark, Mexico, Swedenl, 
and EU-wide liberalisation is taking place in telecommunications, airlines and electricity 
sectors. •
• Innovation and technology. Japan, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands have taken 
steps to increase public R&D spending, whereas measures to increase the efficiency of 
spending have been taken in the same countries and in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Austria, Norway and Sweden. Tax incentives for private R&D activity have 
recently been increased or amended to increase their efficiency in Canada, Australia and 
the Netherlands. A number of countries have taken initiatives to improve the provision of 
finance for innovation through development of venture capital markets. Japan has 




























































































included a significant step towards the establishment of international minimum standards 
of patent protection.
• Entrepreneurship. Germany, Mexico and the Netherlands have taken measures to reduce 
"red tape" for business start-ups and Germany has also extended exemptions for very small 
companies from employment protection requirements. Measures to ease financing 
constraints for small and medium-sized companies have been taken in Japan. Germany. 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia. Austria. Belgium, Finland, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. In Germany, France and Austria, steps 
have been taken to strengthen links between SMEs and research centres.
1) Only reforms introduced or decided until summer 1996 are considered. A much more extensive 
overview of policy reforms in the 1990s is presented in OECD (1997b).
Nevertheless, in a number of policy areas, most countries have shied away from 
pursuing policy reforms which would directly and negatively affect core groups 
on the labour market and have instead relied on other adjustments:
• Few countries have cut replacement rates or maximum durations of 
unemployment benefits more than marginally whereas many have tightened 
benefit administration and eligibility rules, which are more likely to affect 
marginal groups on the labour market (Table 2).
• Though some action has been taken to weaken general employment 
protection legislation, countries have generally shown greater willingness to 
introduce and liberalise fixed-term contracts and job protection for part-time 
workers and workers in small firms, which also affect mainly marginal
groups.
• Some governments have focused on increasing product market competition in 
order to increase market pressures for more flexible labour market regulations 
and practices rather than aiming to reform the latter directly.
To some extent, the countries which have seen significant reductions in 
structural unemployment are the ones which have managed to introduce reforms 
that affected also labour market insiders13.
13) For example, among the countries which experienced falling structural unemployment, 
both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom cut maximum benefit duration whereas 




























































































Table 2. Evolution of unemployment benefit systems over the 1990s









United States 11.1 11.8 = =
Japan 9.9 9.9 = =
Germany 28.1 26.4 X =
France 37.2 37.5 = X
Italy 2.5 19.7 X =
United Kingdom 17.5 18.1 X X
Canada 27.8 27.3 X X
Australia 26.5 27.3 X X
Austria 31.0 25.8 X =
Belgium 42.3 41.6 X X
Denmark 51.9 70.3 X X
Finland 38.8 43.2 = X
Greece 17.1 22.1 = =
Ireland 29.3 26.1 X =
Netherlands 51.3 45.9 X X
New Zealand 30.4 29.8 X X
Norway 38.8 38.8 = X
Portugal 34.4 35.2 = =
Spain 33.5 31.7 X X
Sweden 29.4 27.3 X =
Switzerland 21.9 29.5 X X
Note:
1. Benefit entitlements before tax as a percentage of previous earnings before tax. Data shown are 
averages over different eamings levels, length of unemployment spells, and family situations. The 
index does not lake into account social assistance at the regional or local level. For further 
information and comparison with other indicators of generosity, see Martin (1996).
2. X denotes that the country has taken action; = means no action





























































































3. The central issue dividing the more comprehensive reformers from the 
less comprehensive is differences in judgement about potential conflicts 
between better labour market performance and concerns for equity and 
social cohesion
A key reason cited for slow and sporadic implementation of the OECD Jobs 
Strategy is the perception that undertaking reform involves conflict with policy 
objectives concerning equity and social cohesion. In particular, concern has 
been expressed in some quarters that the Jobs Strategy recommendations to 
enhance wage flexibility and to reform social transfer systems would be at odds 
with the policy objectives of ensuring some degree of equity across members of 
the labour force or the population at large. The follow-up work to the Jobs 
Study has not provided conclusive evidence as to the nature and magnitudes of 
any potential trade-offs. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that these 
objectives do not necessarily conflict, or at least that the terms of the trade-off 
change, when they are seen in a dynamic perspective. Three reasons have been 
quoted for this:
• First, increased employment as a result of policy reform will tend to offset at 
least partly the impact of increased wage-rate dispersion and restricted social 
transfers on income distribution. Thus, a wider distribution of wage rates is 
likely to enhance the employment prospects of workers at the bottom of the 
qualification scale. Such effects may lie behind the negative cross-country 
correlation between widening of the bottom part of the wage-rate distribution 
and the change in unemployment and the positive, albeit weak, correlation 
between a wider distribution at the bottom of the pay scale and the rise in 
employment (see Figure 6). Nevertheless, this evidence is far from conclusive 
and there is little agreement about the magnitude of such employment effects, 
with econometric estimates of elasticities between relative wage-rates and 
demand for different categories of labour being both highly uncertain and 
variable across studies14.
14) For example, estimates of elasticities of substitution between different categories of labour 
substantially above I have been found by Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy 
(1992) for the United States, and Risager (1992) for Denmark. In contrast, Machin el al. 
(1996) find an elasticity of around I for the United States and less than '/a for the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden. OECD (1996a) presented a number of simple cross­
country correlations between wage distributions and indicators of labour-market 
performance without finding any strong relationships, though that result may reflect the 
focus on static correlations and the fact that different distributions of qualifications across 




























































































• Second, there is evidence of considerable mobility of individuals over time 
within the wage scale, implying that in some cases low-paid employment may 
be a stepping-stone to better pay. Across countries, with large differences in 
the static distribution of earnings, the degree of mobility appears to be 
remarkably similar15. As a rule of thumb, it seems that after a period of five 
years only about a third of those full-time workers initially receiving low 
earnings (belonging to the lowest earnings quintile) do so at the end of the 
period (Table 3). And among full-time workers continuously employed over 
the 1986-91 period only 3 to 5 per cent remained in the lowest quintile 
throughout the period. A large part of the workers who left low-paid 
employment had moved up in the earnings distribution, though in some 
countries a significant fraction had also moved out of employment. Young 
persons in particular have a high likelihood of moving up in the earnings 
distribution. However, older and less educated workers run a higher risk of 
becoming trapped in low-paid jobs. Moreover, there are indications that 
"cycling" may take place, with those moving upwards in the earnings 
distribution subsequently falling back again. As a result, among workers with 
continuous employment those who started out as low-paid in 1986 on average 
spent some 3Vi to 4 years in the low-paid group.
15) This is based on the comparative data on earnings mobility in a number of countries 
presented in OECD (1996a and 1997a). The finding of broadly similar mobility patterns 




























































































Figure 6. Earnings distribution and labour market performance
Panel A: Cycle-io-cycle changes in employment rates and earning distribution
Correlation coeff.= 0.5 ,
. o Chance in earnings disubuiion 1
- m a n o i r =  I X  '
Panel B: Cycle-lo-cycle changes in structural unemployment and earning distribution
'°-06 Corrclati8frtocff.= 000 0 0 ï 00J 006 "°*  010
t-Statistic= -2.3 Change in earnings dislibuiion 1 *
1. Changes between recession periods.
For United Slates. United Kingdom. Canada. Australia changes are between averages of 1980-82 and 1990-91 
For Japan. France. Italy, Austria. Belgium. Finland. Netherlands. New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland 
changes are between averages o f 1981-84 and 1990-93.
West Germany was not included because of lack of data for the 1990s.
2. Data are from Labour Forer Statistics.
3. Average annual absolute change in the ratio between median and first decile earnings of full-time 
workers, based on the Employment Outlook 1996. Table 3.1.
4 Structural unemployment data are based on Secretarial estimates of the non-accelerating wage rate of 
unemployment (NAWRU) made for the OECD Economic Outlook. 60. 1996




























































































Table 3. Retention rates in low earnings after five years'
Low earnings defined as botiom quinlile among: Low earnings
defined as below 
0.65 median earnings 
of full-time wage and 
salary workers
Full-time wage and 
salary workers
All employed wage 
and salary workers
United States
Male 29.4 28.2 31.2
Female 31.2 57.9 35.4
Germany
Male 14.4 20.1 10.7
Female 34.6 48.3 18.2
France
Male 28.5 21.3 17.5
Female 42.4 32.9 28.0
Italy
Male 37.2 29.8 15.3
Female 49.8 41.2 23.0
Denmark
Male 19.6 40.6 4.8
Female 37.6 44.0 6.7
Finland
Male 30.1 45.3 30.0
Female 28.0 40.4 24.5
Sweden
Male 22.7 25.8 -
Female 40.7 42.9 -
United Kingdom
Male 30.7 - 28 1
Female 38.7 - 37.0
Note:
1. Share of the low-wage population in 1986 that received low earnings also in 1991.
Source: OECD (1996a) and further calculations based on the longitudinal data sets used in 
that publication. •
• Third, lower relative incomes at the bottom of the scale may raise incentives 
for investment in human capital by groups who would otherwise have made 
little such investment; the existence of this kind of linkage is supported by 




























































































whet* the financial rewards to such education is higher (Figure 7),f>. Such an 
effect in tum could reduce income dispersion over the longer run and assist 
the adaptation of the workforce to changing skills requirements.
In spite of these arguments, representatives from a number of countries at the 
EDRC considered that there was a trade-off between horizontal equity and 
employment objectives, but at the same time argued that its strength was 
susceptible to policy influence. However, for two very different sets of reasons, 
representatives from other countries rejected the notion of a trade-off. Thus, 
representatives from some English-speaking countries saw low unemployment 
as an essential condition for, or element of, horizontal equity. And those from 
some continental European countries saw equity as a more fundamental goal 
than low unemployment.
In addition to the traditional arguments stressing market failure as a reason for 
government involvement in education, training and active labour market 
policies, many countries see these policies as a way of supporting horizontal 
equity without having to pay a price in terms of lower economic efficiency, or 
vice versa. Some, most notably France, Belgium and the Nordic countries, resist 
a wider distribution of wage rates as a means to reduce uiienu ! ..merit and 
instead rely on these policies to bring the dispersion of individual productivity 
levels into line with the prevailing wage distribution. However, a compressed 
wage structure and generous social transfers limit the financial returns to private 
investment in human capital, and it is not clear to what extent public 
expenditure can compensate for weaker incentives for private investment in this 
area. There is also a question mark over the effectiveness of much public 
spending on active labour market policies, suggesting a need for further efforts 
to raise their efficiency if they are to play a substantial role in affecting the 
distribution of individual earnings capacities16 7.
16) It should be noted that the rates of return shown in Figure 7 do not take into account the 
effects of tax-transfer systems, including support for students, or different unemployment 
risks across education categories. Freeman (1986) presents an overview of empirical 
estimates concerning the link between the return to education and demand for it. More 
recently, Fredriksson (1997) and Hers (1997) have presented supportive evidence on this 
link in the cases of, respectively, Sweden and the Netherlands.
17) Scarpetta (1996) in a combined cross-country/time-series approach to identify the 
influence of policy and institutional factors on unemployment finds an only weakly 
significant effect from spending on active labour market policies, which contributes very 
little to explaining cross-country differences in unemployment over the period 1983 to 
1993. This limited impact may of course in principle reflect that these measures are 
reflected more in higher real wages than in lower unemployment. Moreover, when omitting 




























































































Figure 7. Internal rate of return and university graduation rates
Per cent
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Notes:
1. Ratio o f graduates from short first university degree program m es to population at the
typical age o f graduation in 1994 (long first university degree program mes where short first degree 
programmes are not available (Austria, France and Germany)).
2. Based on university wage premia in the early 1990s, theoretical length o f study and 
assumed retirem ent at age 65 (see table 30).




























































































Thus, it remains an open question whether a policy approach that sees public 
intervention in post-compulsory education, training and active labour market 
policies as a substitute for relative wage flexibility is effective, let alone cost- 
effective, particularly in a world of rapid structural change where shifts in 
demand for particular skills are likely to exceed the pace at which skill supplies 
can be adjusted through education and training. At the same time, however, 
there is also concern about the effectiveness of relative wage signals in 
influencing human capital investment, not least because increased inequality of 
income, in a context of imperfect capital markets, may prevent those at the 
bottom of the income distribution from investing in their own or their children s 
education18. The recommendations given by the EDRC may be seen as 
favouring a combination of the two policy approaches, relying both on the 
market mechanism, through relative wage signals, and government support to 
education and training and active labour market policies in the pursuit of equity 
and employment objectives.
Delegates to the EDRC from some countries, including France, Austria and 
Belgium, have cited fear of negative consequences not only for horizontal 
equity but also for the much wider concept of social cohesion as a reason for 
adopting a measured and incremental approach to reform along the lines of the 
OECD Jobs Strategy. Such consequences, were they to occur, would be 
undesirable in their own right and may also entail high economic costs. Indeed, 
v. uh social cohesion goes a set of common norms and standards of behaviour 
without which individual opportunistic behaviour might be difficult, or at least 
very costly, to constrain. At the same time, however, high and persistent 
unemployment is itself likely to seriously impair social cohesion.
Beyond a basic level of social cohesion, many, predominantly continental 
European, countries have gone further to establish institutions with the purpose 
of seeking social consensus. The aim here is to achieve an alignment of interests 
and wide-ranging agreements on policy actions comprising also organised, non­
governmental groups, most prominently labour market organisations. In 
countries where this approach is argued to have worked — including Austria, 
Ireland, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands — social consensus is seen not 
only as a desirable outcome in itself, but the gains are believed also to comprise 
a better overall economic performance. For example, consensus policy in these 
countries is argued to increase aggregate wage flexibility, to reduce the risk of 
and thereby the loss associated with conflict, to provide decision makers with a 
stable environment for long-term planning, and to enhance the degree of trust 
and thereby economise on transaction costs.




























































































In the review process, countries not relying on corporatist institutions have 
pointed to the risk that such institutions may, over time, become increasingly 
static in their outlook and gradually come to serve the interests of labour market 
insiders to the detriment of outsiders. These institutions may also prove less 
flexible in a dynamically changing environment. For example, it was argued 
that institutions of consensus and corporatism, which usually go hand-in-hand 
with a centralised element in wage bargaining, may have increased the 
flexibility of aggregate wages in the past — arguably the case in Austria, 
Norway and Sweden — but that they may work less efficiently in a low-inflation 
climate and are much less adapted to deal with economic changes which require 
changes in relative wages19. The risk may also be particularly high in a 
corporatist set-up that failure to adjust relative wages and associated 
malfunctioning of labour markets could then spill over into pressures on the 
government to expand early retirement schemes and other fiscal measures to 
encourage withdrawal from the labour force.
Partly for these reasons, the role of strong political leadership in introducing 
structural reform has been stressed in the cases of the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand. And in these countries, structural reforms seem, as noted above, to 
have been sufficient to reduce structural unemployment over the 1990s. In the 
case of the latter country it was argued that since structural reforms imply the 
destruction of economic rents, undertaking deep structural reforms through a 
consensual process is difficult. However, the Netherlands and Ireland also 
experienced falling structural unemployment and are examples of countries 
where both macroeconomic policies and comprehensive structural reforms were 
implemented based on processes of decision making involving the social 
partners directly. Thus, the experience of these four countries suggests that 
there are different approaches to successfully implementing the Jobs Strategy, 
depending on national traditions and institutions. This latter lesson is reinforced 
by the experiences of the United States, Japan and Norway which, as noted 
above, have maintained relatively low structural rates of unemployment.
19) See e.g. Calmfors (1993) on the relationship between centralisation of wage bargaining, 
real wages, inflation and relative wage developments. Scarpetta (1996) presents evidence 
of a hump-shaped relationship between an indicator of centralisation and unemployment, 
and also shows results to suggest that increased employer coordination is associated with 
lower unemployment whereas the opposite is the case for worker bargaining strength, as 
proxied by union density. OECD (1997a), using a somewhat different specification, finds 
little evidence of systematic links between features of bargaining systems and 
unemployment. It did, however, find strong evidence that more centralised and/or co­




























































































There are also similarities between the four countries that managed to 
significantly reduce structural unemployment. A crucial common feature 
facilitating the reform processes both in the Netherlands, and, to some extent. 
Ireland, on the one hand, and in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, on the 
other hand, may have been the notion that individual reforms were part of a 
wider programme or strategy. Hence, specific reforms that affected particular 
groups met with less resistance because they were seen as part of an overall 
strategy affecting much wider groups and thereby possessing an element of 
fairness, which is an essential factor working for social cohesion.
4. There are significant synergies between structural reforms in different 
fields
Seeing structural reforms as part of an overall strategy is also important because 
reforms in one area produce better results if other areas are also reformed, while 
sometimes the beneficial effects of reform in one area may be blocked by 
impediments elsewhere20. As a result, broad-based reform is likely to be more 
effective than reform focused in particular areas21. One general channel for such 
interactions arises from the effects of policy reform on government budgets: 
many reforms which raise employment and lower unemployment will also result 
in reduced public expenditure or higher tax revenue, thereby permitting lower 
tax rates, which, in turn, may set off further improvements in labour market 
performance. A few more specific examples of such interactions include22:
• Increasing incentives for seeking and accepting jobs is likely to be more 
effective when, on the one hand, product market reforms have ensured that 
labour demand will react swiftly and significantly to changes in wages and, 
on the other hand, regulations governing industrial relations, minimum wages 
and employment protection are reformed in ways which ensure that such a 
wage response will be forthcoming swiftly.
• Easing employment protection legislation may, by raising turnover in the 
labour market and the supply of vacancies, enhance the effectiveness of
20) This point was emphasised in Lindbeck (1996). Coe and Snower (1996) illustrate such 
complementarities in a search model, including taxation, employment protection, 
bargaining power, unemployment benefits and job creation.
21) In a chapter on ‘Interactions between Structural Reform, Macroeconomic Policy and 
Economic Performance', OECD (1996b) discusses a number of issues related to the 
political economy of structural relorm.




























































































active labour market policies as well as the enforcement of availability for 
and willingness to work criteria in unemployment benefit systems.
• Where other transfer schemes such as invalidity, early retirement, social 
assistance etc. are comparable in generosity to unemployment benefits, 
tightening of the latter scheme is likely to be more effective in terms of 
reducing overall under-utilisation of labour, as opposed to measured 
unemployment, if accompanied by tightening of the former schemes. 
Conversely, reducing the generosity of other transfer programmes may be 
ineffectual without tightening of unemployment benefits.
• Where wage rigidities, caused, for example, by legislated minimum wages or 
administrative extension of wage agreements, prevent wages from falling in 
response to higher employer social security contributions, the effects of 
increases in payroll tax rates may be particularly onerous.
Interactions between structural policies may also be political in nature. This 
may sometimes lead to cases of substitutability, rather than complementarity, 
between structural reforms in different fields. For example, the absence of an 
adequate social safety net has in some cases been seen as strengthening the 
political case for various types of employment protection, including severance 
pay (Greece, Mexico, Turkey) or, conversely, its existence has been seen as a 
political pre-condition for a liberal job protection regime (Denmark).
5. Macroeconomic conditions and their interactions with structural forces 
are important for labour market outcomes
Macroeconomic conditions are very important for labour market outcomes and 
this has been reflected in the recommendations given to individual countries by 
the EDRC. There are two dimensions here: establishing an appropriate medium- 
and long-term framework for policies and preventing excessive short-run 
fluctuations in output and employment.
The OECD Jobs Study emphasised the role of macroeconomic policy in 
reducing unemployment by providing a stable framework, based on sound 
public finances and price stability. A main channel through which budget 
consolidation may affect unemployment over the longer term is via its impact 
on real interest rates23:
23) Orr et al. (1996) estimate that a rise in the government deficit of 1 per cent of GDP will 
lead to an increase in domestic real interest rates of between 1/6 and 1/3 percentage points 




























































































• First, a fall of real interest rates may lower production costs in much the same 
way that lower payroll taxes or energy prices would do and it may raise 
capital accumulation and thereby labour productivity. Where wage earners do 
not receive a corresponding increase in real wages, unemployment is likely to 
fall24.
• Second, lower real interest rates may in some cases affect the bargaining 
attitudes of workers and the labour demand behaviour of enterprises with the 
end result of lower unemployment25 26.
• Third, lower real interest rates could favourably affect productivity growth, 
either temporarily, while the capital-intensity of production responds, or more 
long-lasting if the rate of innovation and its diffusion are affected Increased 
productivity growth again might cause unemployment to fall. This would be 
the case to the extent it reduced the incidence of downward wage stickiness 
or facilitated wage bargaining by increasing the scope for real wage gains2”.
effects have been found by authors focusing on the effects of government debt. Thus, 
estimates suggesting that a 1 percentage point rise in debt/GDP ratios may increase real 
interest rates by 14 to 24 basis points have been reported by Helbling and Wescott (1995) 
and Poi I .uid Laxton (1995).
24) This line of reasoning has been emphasised by Cotis et al. (1996) to suggest that higher 
real interest rates have been a factor behind the rise in French unemployment since the 
early 1970s. However, while wage rigidities are likely to prevent full wage adjustment to 
an increase in real interest rates, for example because of institutional hindrances such as 
minimum wages, there is a question as to whether the same incomplete adjustment can be 
assumed when real interest rates fall, since, for example, minimum wages do not prevent 
wages from rising.
25) Manning (1992) has argued that, in a context where current employment raises the 
chances of future employment, higher real interest rates will harden the bargaining stance 
of wage earners because the present value of future earnings is diminished, reducing also 
the value of current jobs and thereby the expected loss from pressing for higher wages. 
Phelps (1992) emphasises that higher real interest rates will reduce the asset value to firms 
of their customer base and their stock of employees familiarised with the firm, and thereby 
reduce labour demand at a given level of real wages. The links between real interest rates 
and unemployment are discussed further in Mellis and Webb (1997).
26) There is some empirical evidence suggestive of a link between productivity growth and 
unemployment. Manning (1992) argues that a substantial part of the rise in unemployment 
until the early part of the 1980s can be explained by lower productivity growth. Turner et 
al. (1993) present results suggesting that such effects are large in the case of Germany but 




























































































Empirical estimates of the effects of real interest rates on unemployment have 
given results which are variable but suggestive of significant impacts in some 
countries27.
Price stability has now been recognised as the primary goal of monetary policy 
in virtually all OECD countries. However, there is some disagreement as 
regards the long-term impact on unemployment of moving to price stability as 
compared with accepting stable but moderate rates of inflation:
• On the one hand, moves to, and the maintenance of, price stability may have 
favourable effects on labour markets to the extent they reduce risk premia in 
real interest rates associated with inflation variability28 or lead to improved 
resource allocation and higher productivity. Both cross-country evidence and 
time-series evidence from individual countries is suggestive of a link between 
lower inflation and higher output growth, though it remains an open question 
whether this link holds also for moves from already low inflation to price 
stability29.
• On the other hand, the presence of nominal wage floors may prevent wages 
from falling in absolute terms and such effects could impede relative and, 
indeed, aggregate real wage adjustment at price stability, putting upward 
pressure on unemployment. Such nominal floors would obviously tend to be 
less constraining in conditions of high productivity growth which would 
explain why it was possible to combine low inflation and low unemployment 
in the 1960s but not now. There is some empirical evidence suggesting that 
nominal wage floors are indeed present and that the importance of downward
27) Scarpetta (1996) finds that across 17 OECD countries the rise in real interest rates 
accounted for between 1 and 3 percentage points of the rise in the unemployment rate over 
the period 1971-93. Manning (1992), in a study of 19 OECD countries, finds effects 
suggesting that a I percentage point increase in real interest rates may increase 
unemployment by between zero and I percentage point. Phelps (1992) in a study of 
17 OECD countries finds an impact of 0.1 to 0.4 percentage points. Cotis et al. (1996) 
report estimates suggesting that rising real interest rates accounted for about half of the rise 
in the French equilibrium unemployment rate between 1974 and the mid-1990s.
28) Orr et al. (1995) present evidence that, across countries, real interest rates are correlated 
with the extent of exchange-rate depreciation and inflation and estimate an impact on real 
interest rates from errors in inflation expectations which may be interpreted as an inflation- 
risk adjustment.
29) For an overview, see Edey (1995). More recently, Feldstein (1996) has argued that 
because tax distortions of household saving and investment decisions are large even at 




























































































sticky wages increases with declining inflation30,31. However, the argument 
has been made that this evidence relates to periods when inflation was non- 
negligible and, thus, may not be representative of the importance of nominal 
floors at price stability when expectations have adjusted to that situation. 
Nevertheless, to the extent expectations are slow to adjust, this may argue in 
favour of slow movement towards price stability, when this has not already 
been attained.
As noted, the second main orientation for macroeconomic policies is to 
minimise macroeconomic fluctuations as far as is realistically possible within 
the scope given by other policy targets and constraints. Countries with the room 
for manoeuvre to counteract prolonged slumps in macroeconomic conditions 
have avoided strong increases in actual unemployment and estimated structural 
unemployment. In contrast, countries with relatively large fluctuations in 
unemployment have usually also seen stronger rises in structural unemployment 
because increases in unemployment which were initially cyclical in origin have 
often tended, over time, to become structural. Indeed, the countries where 
structural unemployment rose the most in the 1990s were largely the ones where 
the cyclical volatility of unemployment increased significantly (Figure 8), with 
Finland and Sweden as extreme cases where strong economic downturns led to 
a persistent ratcheting up of unemployment. Correspondingly, the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand may not have experienced a fall in structural 
unemployment commensurate with their structural reforms because cyclical 
fluctuations in unemployment became more pronounced in the past decade. 
Spain is a somewhat similai ise where a further increase in the variability of 
unemployment since the mid-1980s led to a rise in structural unemployment 
despite a number of structural reform initiatives over the past decade. The 
substrmii >1 increase in the German structural unemployment-rate despite a slight 
fall in cyclical variability, is related, not least, to the re-unification of the
30) Looking at distributions of wage changes, several authors have found a spike at zero (for 
an overview of these results, see Braun and Chen (1996) or Chappie (1996). Concerning 
the relation between stickiness and inflation, Chappie (1996) estimated a significantly 
negative effect from expected inflation on the incidence of sticky wages in New Zealand, 
and Fortin (1996) argues that at inflation ta below 4 per cent, wage stickiness exerts 
significant upward pressure on unemployment in Canada. Using state-level data for the 
United States, Card and Hyslop (1996) found that the incidence of sticky wages in the 
United States did not depend very strongly on the rate of inflation. In contrast, Akerlof et 
al. (1996) criticise as spurious the evidence of nominal wage reductions based on panel 
data and set up a model showing large unfavourable unemployment effects as a result of a 
fall in inflation.
31) The literature on wage bargaining has in some cases argued that multi-layered bargaining 
entails a need for each level of bargaining to produce positive wage increases which may 




























































































country and the rapid convergence in labour market institutions and policies as 
well as wages between the two parts of the country.
The extent to which cyclical unemployment increases are transformed into 
higher structural unemployment depends on structural policy settings3'. The 
policy implications of these relationships include:
• For countries with very rigid labour markets, macroeconomic instability 
carries a particularly high price in terms of structural unemployment whereas 
countries with flexible labour markets, most notably the United States, have 
experienced large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment around a rather 
stable trend.
• Moves towards medium-term macroeconomic targets will often be less costly 
in terms of unemployment if the appropriate structural policies have been 
implemented first. Conversely, a sequencing which involves moving towards 
macroeconomic targets before implementing structural reform may be 
expensive in terms of unemployment. For example, countries which both 
disinflated significantly and did so with unemployment benefit systems 
which were very generous in terms of benefit duration, tended to experience 
large increases in their structural unemployment rates over the 1980s 
(Figure 9). 32
32) Scarpetta (1996) links slow adjustment of unemployment to strict employment protection, 
generous unemployment benefits and aspects of wage bargaining systems. Barro (1988) 
reports evidence that the existence of corporatist institutions and, where these are not 
present, the degree of unionisation slows down unemployment adjustment. Finally, Layard 
(1989) finds that long benefit durations slow down adjustment whereas centralised 




























































































Figure 8. Cyclical variability and structural unemployment1
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Note:
I. Structural unemployment data are based on Secretariat estimates of the non-accelerating wage rate of 
unemployment (NAWRU) made for the OECD Economic Outlook . 60. 1996 The variable 
on the horizontal axis is the decrease in inflation over the period 1980-90 as measured by the consumer 
price deflator multiplied by the maximum duration of unemployment benefits in the mid-1980s (see 
Layard et al., 1991). The rational for this specification is that increases in unemployment associated 






























































































• Structural rigidities may sometimes be associated with asymmetric responses 
of the economy to unemployment being, respectively, above and below 
structural levels33. Thus, where inflation reacts more strongly when 
unemployment is below its structural rate than when it is above, a policy 
which prevents strong fluctuations will also be associated with a lower 
average rate of unemployment than one which results in stronger fluctuations. 
Where hysteresis effects are asymmetric in the sense that increases, but not 
decreases, in actual unemployment are followed by hysteresis, avoiding large 
cyclical fluctuations is evidently also important. Since fluctuations are 
inevitable even under the best macroeconomic management, these 
observations underscore the need to implement structural reforms to 
eliminate the asymmetries themselves.
The upshot is that structural policy setting consistent with the recommendations 
of the Jobs Strategy is likely not only to reduce unemployment directly but also 
to reduce the risk that unemployment persists following a cyclical downturn.
Other synergies also exist between structural reforms and an appropriate setting 
of macroeconomic policies. For example, progress in structural reform leading 
to lower unemployment rates may increase the credibility of macroeconomic 
policies, with the end-result of reducing risk premia in interest rates and 
diminishing speculative pressures against currencies34.
Conversely, structural reform will be more effective when introduced in stable 
macroeconomic conditions. For example, policies to increase work incentives 
through curbs on welfare provisions work best when the economy is generating 
a reasonable number of job vacancies. Similarly, when activity is high, 
relaxation of employment protection legislation may predominantly act to 
remove a disincentive for hiring, whereas such deregulation is more likely to be 
followed by labour shedding when undertaken in a weak business climate (as 
seems to have been the case recently in Italy). More generally, structural reform 
is usually aimed at giving greater scope for market forces. Improved functioning 
of markets and structural policy settings which are more sustainable should in 
themselves tend to raise confidence, but where structural reform leads to the 
destruction of economic rents — in the shape of excessive prices, wages or job 
security, or low work intensity — confidence could suffer. Macroeconomic
33) Turner (1995) presents evidence on asymmetric inflation effects and Giorno et al. (1996) 
present evidence suggestive of asymmetric hysteresis in some countries.
34) Funke (1996) presents evidence that an increase in unemployment increases the 




























































































policy setting should, as far as possible, take this into account. It is noticeable 
that the countries where structural unemployment has fallen have all had rapid 
enough growth for actual unemployment to fall. However, at the same time 
there is a risk, which judged by past policy developments is non-negligible. that 
when conjunctural conditions are relatively buoyant, the motivation could be 
weakened for undertaking necessary structural reforms.
6. Overall, the Jobs Strategy remains an effective response to labour 
market problems in Member countries, and the EDRC has encouraged 
countries to press on with its implementation
Perhaps it is difficult to imagine the OECD reaching any other conclusion than 
the one just stated. But, as illustrated above, there is indeed some evidence to 
suggest that the Jobs Strategy works. Nevertheless, there are still areas where 
knowledge is weak. The linkages and potential conflicts between reforms to 
enhance economic efficiency and the policy concerns for equity and social 
cohesion are a prominent example. Work is also ongoing to enhance our 
understanding concerning the roles for labour-market performance of 
entrepreneurship and technology — two of the main areas of policy 
recommendations in the OECD Jobs Study. Moreover, continued monitoring of 
the effectiveness of policies pursued in individual countries is also likely to 
generate further insights. Thus, the Jobs Strategy is set to evolve further in the 
light of experience gained and in view of developments in OECD economies.
Summing up, developments in recent years have provided evidence that high 
and persistent unemployment can be cut on a durable basis by adopting the right 
policies. There is no reason for countries to become resigned to high and 
persistent unemployment: a comprehensive approach along the lines of the Jobs 
Strategy holds out promise of improved labour market performance. General 
policy recommendations for implementing the Jobs Strategy have been 
available for some time, but so far they have been acted upon only partially and 
insufficiently in most countries. Country-specific recommendations in line with 
the Strategy, but taking into account the specificity of each country, have now 
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